AbstrAct: Centering around Agamben's key concepts of "bare life" and homo sacer, and reading them against Bruce Gilden's disturbing (and award-winning) photographs of Haiti, this article explores the aesthetic implications, historical limitations, and political dangers of representing humans as mere biological life violently drawn into the ambit of sovereignty.
One day, arriving home from work, I found my two-year-old son drawing furiously on a pile of used office paper. "Look, Mami, look," he said, pointing to his squiggles. There they were, drawn over a black and white photograph, grainy, still, with considerable detail: a corpse on a muddy road, sullied, naked, a mutilated body, no head. I gathered the papers into a pile and took them away, with my son looking at me uncomprehendingly. Pictures of severed limbs, festering wounds, pigs eating corpses: a human rights report on Haiti. I cannot remember who might have sent it to me and have been unable to trace it to its source. No doubt, somewhere in the pile of papers there would have been some explanation, something to justify the circulation of these pictures of horror. Would it help to know who to blame? And then, what was the purpose of the pictures? Is this how a claim for human rights is made: in the grotesque triangulation of a desecrated body of a victim, an intrepid photographer, and an awed metropolitan reader?
The representation of human life violently reduced to its bare bones, beings without the accoutrements of "context" or history, human life as indistinguishable from animal life, what Giorgio Agamben has called bare life-nuda vita-raises some serious concerns. This essay is not, I should say from the outset, an investigation into the operations of global power, the crisis of legitimacy of the nation-state, or indeed the many philosophical complications of Agamben's theory of the state. It is an interrogation of the operations and effects of a representational mode, a rhetoric, an imagery that has as its subject just that: the violence that produces "bare life."1
The example of Haiti is not coincidental. The discourse of Haiti as a place where the ordinary constraints of human society do not apply goes back to the origins of the state in a slave revolution, which was perceived by French colonists and most observers abroad not as a political event with political goals, an event to be understood in the context of the revolutionary age, but as a matter of bloodshed, rape, and boundless material destruction. The most circulated and repeated story was that of the insurgents using a white baby impaled on a bayonet as a standard on their marches, a story for which no eyewitness account exists and which is only reported as hearsay by a single French colonist.2 Accounts of that kind seem to have prepared the ground for an imaginary that looks to Haiti to see only this: insurrectional bodies, tortured bodies, bodies in trance. This despite the fact that much of Haitian history, from the slave uprisings that began in 1791 and the struggles to preserve independence in a slaveholding Atlantic, to the painstaking contestation of theories of racial inequality and an anthropology that mistook measurements of skulls and bones for an account of "humanity," is in fact a determined assertion of political subjecthood.3 Haitian intellectuals throughout the nineteenth century spent enormous efforts to defend their country against the calumnies of outside observers and scientists, but to no avail. Spencer St. John's Hayti or The Black Republic (1884), Hollywood's zombie movies ("the living dead"), and innumerable other texts mix For recent discussions of the issue of violence and representation, see Donald L. Donham, "Staring at Suffering: 1.
Violence as Subject," Gobineau (1816 Gobineau ( -1882 and a rigorous refutation of craniology and related practices deemed scientific at the time, but an attempt to reconstitute "anthropology" as a holistic, contextual discipline equally devoted to the study of physical, intellectual, and moral phenomena. Despite the fact that Firmin's work is in many ways much closer to twentieth-century anthropology than most of nineteenth-century European anthropology, it fell into obscurity, while Gobineau's work went through innumerable editions (Carolyn Fluehr-Lobbain, " Haiti (1978) . As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has pointed out, it almost does not matter whether these texts and films belong to a racistcolonialist imaginary and simply showcase the triumph of the white narrator's heroism and rationality in the face of impenetrable darkness, or instead mean to offer sympathetic defenses of Haitian eccentricities; nor, I would add, whether they aspire to a post/modern exploration of the constraints of Western selfhood.4 In each case, Haiti is returned to the reader as the bare-boned, incomprehensible place of unspeakable cruelty and bodily suffering, of Tonton Macoutes and "voodoo doctors" and corpses drifting in muddy swimming pools, as a liminal space on the edge of Western civilization, without the social and political practices and taboos that constitute life in Western society.
There are a number of important studies of the discourse of Haitian Otherness and its rhetoric that trace its political, literary, and scholarly ramifications. These include Laënnec Hurbon's classic work on the denigration and suppression of vodou, Michael Dash's study of literary depictions of Haiti in the United States, and Michel-Rolph Trouillot's brief programmatic essay "The Odd and the Ordinary."5 There is a question, however, that is rarely raised: What is the appeal of this discourse of deviance? What desire is being satisfied? Clearly, there are economic and strategic interests of the hegemonic powers in the Atlantic world that are being served. But that does not explain the peculiar shape this discourse takes at times, and why it keeps returning.
Bare Life
The discourse of grotesque Otherness evidently feeds on a number of heterogeneous sources and interests and is deeply embedded in the ideologies of colonialism and racial slavery. It is not my intention here to trace these complex genealogies, nor do I mean to analyze this discourse in its heterogeneity and contradictory repetitiveness. The aspect I will focus on here Michel-Rolph Trouillot, "The Odd and the Ordinary: Haiti, the Caribbean, and the World," 4.
Cimarrón: New Perspectives on the Caribbean 2, no. 3, 1990, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] is what I call, appropriating Agamben's term, fantasies of "bare life"-where I take "bare life" to be an emblem of a highly ambivalent attitude toward bodily degradation of humans. What happens when we rhetorically, philosophically, or photographically reduce human beings to their mere physical being, to their suffering, to their mortality?
In Agamben, "bare life" and its embodiment homo sacer are both a product and a constitutive element of sovereignty.6 Homo sacer can be killed without sanction, but cannot be sacrificed. As such, homo sacer can be considered "the originary figure of life taken into the sovereign ban" and as a trace of "the originary exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted."7 Bare life-biological life, animal nature-is outside the political realm, yet constitutive of it. The "sovereign ban" is an effect of the sovereign's "right" to decide over life and death.
For Agamben, the history of the Western state is patterned through the shifting relation between "bare life" and "political life" and an increasing drawing of "bare life" into the ambit of sovereignty. In a teleological fulfillment of a potentiality that can be discerned already in ancient Greece and Rome, we are now witnessing the collapse of the two into each other: politics has turned into biopolitics: "Man has now reached his historical telos and, for a humanity that has become animal again, there is nothing left but the depoliticization of human society by means of the unconditional unfolding of the oikonomia, or the taking of biological life itself as the supreme political (or rather impolitical) task."8 But, and this is indisputably the most controversial aspect of Agamben's account, there is no qualitative difference between our contemporary predicament and the first radical instantiation of biopolitics in the Nazi Death Camps. "The camp-as the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space . . . -will appear as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity, whose metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize."9
In some ways, it is not surprising that Agamben's thought should have such wide appeal.10 Agamben is one of the very few thinkers who seems to be able to give words to what evidently is the most urgent issue in contemporary political theory: the dehumanization entailed by the exclusionary transformation of citizens and political subjects into subjects of management and control. We might think of the ever increasing number of disenfranchised migrant workers, Giorgio Agamben, 6.
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). For a sympathetic discussion of the ambiguities in the concept of "bare life," see Andrew Norris, "Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead," diacritics 30, no. 4 (2000) or the vast numbers of refugees around the world who end up in internment camps beyond the reach of any legal rights and protections; but we can also think of explicitly exclusionary policies such as those that produced the Guantánamo Bay prison camp, secret CIA prisons in Eastern Europe, categories like "enemy combatant" or less overtly violent, "guest worker." What more disturbing pictures of bare life than those of José Padilla, shackled to a stretcher, shipped thus to the site of dental work?11 Other instances may produce less moral outrage, but still support the overall picture: think of those convicts in the United States, who, on account of the sexual character of their offenses, are upon their release placed under twenty-four hour surveillance, barred from certain public areas and activities, and forbidden to reside in certain neighborhoods. The law is done with them-they are released from prison-but they are now subject to the unregulated exercise of power by the state. For Agamben, these developments cannot be understood in terms of unrelated "humanitarian crises" or quasi-accidental breakdowns of the rule of law. They are a structural feature of modern geopolitics and need to be addressed as such.
The timeliness and appeal of Agamben's thought is clear, but there are questions to be raised as well. Take the very term nuda vita: it is a graphic term in a way that other terms, say "biological life" or "mere existence," are not.12 It has a representational quality, a certain starkness that no doubt does a lot to explain the high currency the term has achieved in recent years. I will have more to say about this rhetorical aspect, but in order to fully understand it, we need to consider at least briefly the scope of Agamben's thought.
There is, in the first instance, a striking geopolitical limitation to an argument that moves from the Greek polis to Hobbes, the French Revolution, to Auschwitz. Does colonialism belong to this story? What about slavery? On the face of it, there have never been more exclusionary strategies than slavery and colonialism, and both slavery and colonial administration could easily be regarded as instances of murderous biopolitics.13 Yet neither one fits Agamben's Deborah Sontag, "Video Is a Window Into a Terror Suspect's Isolation," 11.
New York Times, 4 December, 2006, 1. The two pictures printed in the New York Times are stills from a government-made video: one with Padilla tied to a stretcher, his shackled feet and legs protruding through a partition that hides his torso and head, the other one showing him standing uncertainly, with huge dark goggles and his ears plugged. Nuda vita 12.
is a translation of Walter Benjamin's term das blosse Leben in his early essay "Toward a Critique of Violence" in Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften II, 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980, 179-203) . Like "bare" in English, bloss in German can mean "mere," but it is etymologically related to terms like Bloesse and entbloessen, hence to the idea of an exposure or vulnerability due to a (limited) nakedness. But bloss is not synonymous with "naked." By contrast, nudo in Italian can mean both "mere" and "naked," thus shifting the weight toward dramatic, fully exposed nakedness. Note that Cesare Casarino translates nuda vita as "naked life" rather than "bare life," thus taking a stance vis-à-vis the ambiguity of the term in favor of the more dramatic and graphic. picture particularly well. It is difficult to see how one could argue that the slave, at least under the regime of modern racial slavery, relates to the sovereign in a rapport of exclusionary inclusion. The slave is, first and foremost, private property of a master and to that extent not subject to the sovereign ban: the slave may fit the definition of homo sacer as someone who may be killed without being subjected to a homicide or a sacrifice (hence is excluded from both human and divine law); yet, as private property she is "protected" from sovereign despotism. The exclusion (or the "ban") that underlies racial slavery goes much beyond the double exclusion Agamben diagnoses in "bare life."
An interesting instantiation of this problem, and one which is of particular interest since it provides another perspective on the foundations of politics in the West, is John Locke's justification of slavery in chapter IV of the Second Treatise on Government (1690).14 When in the course of a just war a prisoner is taken, Locke argues, he has forfeited his life and can be legitimately enslaved as a way of postponing death. Locke's argument and language certainly resonate with that of homo sacer: the slave is the living dead, the one who has lost his right to life and who has no claim to the legal protections that the political subject-the Englishmanhas. Slavery cannot be a contractual relationship between master and slave, because "no Man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a Power over his own Life."15 The master may kill the slave if he resists, but suicide is not permitted. There is then a de facto limitation on the practice of slavery: no one can contract into slavery. Slavery is a continuation of the state of war; it takes place in a realm that is not based on contracts, hence outside of the political realm altogether.
But consider now Locke's use of the term slavery in the first Treatise on Government, which famously begins: "Slavery is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man, and so directly opposite to the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation; that 'tis hard to conceive, that an Englishman, much less a Gentleman, should plead for't."16 Here Locke evidently defines slavery in relation to sovereignty; i.e., as "political slavery." Note, too, the rhetorical form Locke's polemic takes: he begins his attack on Sir Robert Filmer, the author of Patriarcha (1680) and theorist of absolute power, not with an argument or a statement of principle, but by calling into question his opponent's patriotism and class standing. The point of Locke's opening gambit is not to say that slavery is wrong, but that slavery must not even be defended by the right sort of people. It is surprising, then, to find that this same text should contain a justification of slavery. The issue partly turns on the meaning and use of the term "slavery" in Locke's text. Few contemporary commentators believe that Locke is offering a good faith argument about seventeenth-century racial slavery in the Second Treatise.17 His rather more straightforward approach to the matter in Fundamental Constitutions for the Government of Carolina (1669) would suggest that the unequivocal condemnation of slavery in the First Treatise simply does not refer to racial slavery: "Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever."18 It seems clear that we cannot read Locke as if he subsumed racial slavery under political slavery (as we would need to if we wanted to understand enslaved Africans as an example of Agamben's homo sacer).
What we see here is foundational political theory of the Enlightenment caught in a state of profound disavowal. It seems that the Second Treatise tries to carve out a space outside of contractual obligations, hence outside the realm of the state in the Lockian imaginary, yet capable of sustaining legitimate relations of domination within the terms of a theory of the state based on natural law: the master has complete control over life and death of the slave. Whether or not Locke refers to racial slavery in the Second Treatise is an interesting question, but ultimately it may not be the most important one. The key issue is that he creates a place for "bare life" beyond the reach of the state. It is this space that then became the realm of racial slavery. What we see in Locke is a cleavage opening up between two kinds of slavery, one defined in relation to the sovereign, and one defined in terms of interpersonal domination. The first relation opens toward the space of the political, where slavery will be banned. The second one opens toward the space of property relations, where slavery will be admitted. It is in this second space that racial subjugation becomes the key strategy of domination. Ultimately, this cleavage, which separates politics from race and makes race a nonpolitical issue, became crucial for the foundation of modern politics in the Atlantic World. But it is a cleavage that cannot be grasped with the concept of homo sacer. "Bare life" is rooted in the Greek polis, not in capitalism's property relations.
Colonialism poses slightly different problems for Agamben's theory. For Agamben, the increasing inclusion of "bare life" under sovereignty signifies an increase of power. I would argue that colonial rule is practically always "the state of exception" and is tied to weak sovereignty rather than an increase of power.19 Agamben's teleological story tracks the somewhat familiar story of the increasing bureaucratization of Western societies, where bureaucracy is understood as a limitation on classical politics. This does not fit colonial rule, where the genocidal campaign is carried out with the gun; the camp never was an administrative solution, and bureaucracy never amounts to government. Ultimately, I would argue, there is a reductivism that underlies Agamben's concept of "bare life" understood merely in relation to the all-powerful sovereign who draws "bare life" into his ambit that prevents us not only from understanding some crucial instantiations of exploitative and exterminatory politics, such as colonialism or slavery, but instantiations which became foundational for the establishment of "politics" in the West. At the same time, the abstract graphicness of the concept of "bare life" and the lack of contextual detail in the theory that produces it, make it available for a highly ambiguous fantasy investment. We do not need to get entangled in complexities of historical roots and causes. We can speak of the political catastrophes of the present without getting caught in miserly pity and compassion, or a human rights discourse that ultimately testifies only to its own powerlessness. The extremes of violence of the contemporary state and the degradations imposed on vast populations can be invoked in the style of Greek tragedy, or the unflinching realism of those pictures my son had found on my desk.
In Agamben's thought, "bare life" is certainly not a figure of fantasy. Yet, the dramatic abstractness of the concept, which treats Auschwitz as the truth of Western politics, and its heightened rhetoric of life and death, of state of exception, of sovereign ban, and animalization ultimately create an affective space where identifications and psychical enjoyment go unchecked. Agamben's "impolitical politics" take place under the sign of death: the corpse, not in its universal inviolability, but infinitely violable. The problem is that violence separated from its roots and conditions, suffering pure and simple-even when only referenced in philosophical terms-engages us in ways that no other subject does. Representation of violence creates a certain form of complicity because it engages psychical structures of attraction and repulsion. Historical, philosophical, or representational contextualization, the restoration of contingency, and the reflexive awareness of standpoint, by contrast, work against this complicity. And that is the issue I will pursue in the remainder of this essay.
We might recall here Hannah Arendt's argument in 19.
On Violence (New York: Harvest, 1970) according to which violence and power are in fact opposites and the use of violence indicates a lack of power.
Haiti
Turning the pages in Bruce Gilden's book of photographs entitled Haiti (1996) can feel like an assault.20 Animal carcasses, a Port-au-Prince abattoir, street dogs, a funeral crowd, bodies sweating, bodies covered in dust, bodies dripping with mud, a body prostrate on the street, a corpse lying unattended, eyes open, face covered in flies. Gilden gets unbearably close to his subjects.21 The human body loses its aura, its sense of inviolability in these shots. Skin becomes texturized, sandy, gritty like the surface of a Tapiès painting (see fig. 2 ). It is the physical closeness of the prison guard or the torturer, not that of the parent or the lover. The photographer imposes himself, and his subjects stare right back: not with the collected deep gaze of the fashion model, but with the defiance and mockery of someone who is being intercepted ( fig. 1 ).
Bruce Gilden/Magnum, reprinted by permission.
Bruce Gilden, 20.
Haiti (Stockport: Dewi Lewis, 1997). Other projects of Gilden's include books on New York, the Japanese underworld, and rural Ireland. Thanks to Javier Guerrero for first calling my attention to Gilden's Haiti book. Thanks also to Karen Probasco at Magnum for timely help. Gilden attributes his aesthetics of closeness to Robert Capa, the renown photographer of the Spanish Civil War and 21.
World War II. Gilden cites Capa as saying "if it's not good enough, you are not close enough." See "Bruce Gilden in Conversation with Christine Redmont," Source 10, 3, no. 4 (winter 1997) www.source.ie/issues/issues0120/issue10/ is10artbrugil.html. Fig. 1 Winner of the 1996 European Publishers' Award for Photography, Gilden's book has artistic aspirations. This is not news photography. Haiti is a high-gloss product and the European Publishers' Award meant publication in six languages and wide distribution in Europe and the United States. Although Gilden's style belongs to the tradition of "street photography" of Walker Evans and Henri Cartier-Bresson (which means, among other things, no staged or planned pictures) and thus has historical links to documentary photography, Haiti's mode of circulation and reception is that of art photography, not of photojournalism.
As Gilden explained in a 1997 interview with Christine Redmond for the Irish photography magazine Source, he made his first trip to Haiti in 1984. The fifty-six black and white photographs that make up the book are the result of about sixteen three-week trips. The last pictures were taken in 1995.22 His photographs thus cover the last two years of Jean-Claude Duvalier's dictatorship, dechoukaj (the "uprooting" of Duvalier's apparatus of oppression by acts of popular justice), the violently suppressed elections of 1987, the military regimes of Henri Namphy and Prosper Avril, the Aristide elections, the coup against Aristide, and Aristide's return to Haiti in 1994. But the reader does not know this: the photographs have no titles, no captions, no dates. The only context offered is a brief introductory essay by the British writer Ian Thomson, who in turn composed his text largely by lifting passages out of his travel narrative Bonjour Blanc, an account of his travels in Haiti in the years between the fall of Duvalier in 1986 and 1990.23 The text is broken up into two-or three-sentence paragraphs that alternate between boldface and ordinary print with no apparent logic, and jump restlessly between the 1791-1804 revolution, the Duvalier regime of the mid-twentieth century, and the present. In the end, any sense of coherence and narrative is lost: the dominant effect is that of disorientation.
We could dismiss Gilden's photographs as another instantiation of the discourse of Haiti's grotesque Otherness. What country would not appear bizarre if you scramble the context sufficiently? The publisher's publicity office, in any event, must have decided that that was the way to sell the book. This is how the short editorial description ends: "Steeped in Voodoo and brutalised by its rulers, [Haiti] is a country where human life is cheap and animals hardly worthy of life. The unconscious violence that runs through from slaughterhouse to street is chillingly captured in Gilden's photographs."24 Note the play on opposition and implication: accepting the images of Haitian Otherness, we also accept the idea that we, who ever that may be, are not steeped in religious ritual, and that Haitians are not brutalized by ad-hoc foreign I was not able to confirm dates and other details, because attempts to schedule an interview with Bruce Gilden did 22.
not work out in time for this article. In Magnum's web gallery, Gilden's pictures of Haiti are supplied with titles, dates, and locations (see www.magnumphotos.com ). The published book does not contain this information. The book also does not arrange the pictures chronologically. If there is a narrative to the arrangement of the pictures, it would be a story that moves from the hardships of life, through rituals of death and redemption, to death itself. Ian Thomson, 23.
Bonjour Blanc: A Journey through Haiti. 1992 (London: Vintage, 2004 . The publisher's blurb announces it as "an enthralling journey into the shadowy republic of Haiti. The land of Voodoo, zombies, and the Tonton Macoute. In this classic account, history jostles with adventure, high comedy is touched with danger; and Haiti glows like a magic charm." The Daily Telegraph is quoted on the front cover: "Hair-raising but hugely entertaining." The narrative itself is journalistic and mostly sympathetic to the plight of Haitians. Still, it is plainly annoying to read "The politics of this island [Gonâve] might have derived from Alice in Wonderland. But this was the comedy that one looked for in Haiti-the comedy of the banana skin." (62) Compare this to the praise Thomson's previous book, a biography of Primo Levi, received in the New York Times: "Mr. Thomson's reserve enables him to deal frankly with Levi's emotional struggles and personal shortcomings, while avoiding the modern biographer's overpowering temptations: to treat his main character as a moral inferior or a patient to be diagnosed." (Antony Grafton, "Surviving Auschwitz, Surrendering to Despair," Books of the Times, 8 November, 2003) . That one could not say about his dealings with Haiti. See the publisher's online catalogue at 24.
www.dewilewispublishing.com/PHOTOGRAPHY/Bruce_Gilden.html.
interventions. In Haiti, politics and religion exist only as a form of devolution. As a reviewer for the UK-based Haiti Support Group, Leah Gordon, says about Gilden's book, "these visions seem more exploited than comprehended. The pages are crowded with blind eyes, skulking dogs and graveyard hysterics. This seems to represent the typical colonial curio mentality, obscuring Haiti by mystification."25 Certainly, I understand why the reviewer felt that way about Gilden's pictures. The first time I saw them my reaction was similar. It does not help that some of the editorial decisions about the book were evidently dictated by the expectation that the "colonial curio shop" sells and that Haiti is most attractive if presented as incomprehensible. But the photographs themselves are a slightly different story. I have come to think that they are problematic in a much more profound way, and that they embody an aesthetics of "bare life" that is not simply equivalent with the colonialist clichés of travelers' narratives and zombie movies. It is because of their artistic complexity and their reflexive structure that they offer an opening for a reflection on the difficulty of representing violence, the rhetoric of "bare life," and the moral and political dilemmas that come with this.
Compare Gilden's pictures to those of the well-known Brazilian photographer Sebastião Salgado: where Salgado offers us a humanist celebration of the heroism and beauty of "the people" in sweeping canvasses reminiscent of nineteenth-century historical paintings, Gilden forces us to look closely. And what we see is the violability of the body. The Gilden photographs are taken as if in defiance of any public and private distinction: taken in public, the photos deliberately violate their subject's intimacy. Consider fig. 1 , evidently a picture of a funeral: the photographer must be crouching right next to the open grave. No room for piety here.
There is also no space for politics in these crowded pictures: no public buildings, no monuments, no political activities recognizable as such. The production of "bare life" is the combined effect of certain photographic techniques such as closeness to the object and the use of daylight flash, and the editorial decision to erase any reference to the highly politicized, tumultuous time between 1984 and 1995. The people that make up Haiti are not political subjects.
Yet, the subjects of the photographs do not exist without relation to power. Take the portrait of a man with his eyes squeezed shut ( fig. 3) , two hands manipulating his head. In the Magnum web gallery the caption reads "Port-au-Prince. 1995. La Saline. The beating." With that information, we are likely to make a connection between the man's evident The implied story would be a political one. But without a caption, a different story emerges. Not knowing that the subject has suffered a beating, we focus on what seems most disconcerting: a hand on the left, in a latex glove, pulling the crown of his head in one direction, another hand coming from the right, pulling his chin in the other. The intention of the gesture is familiar from the photo studio: to avoid the mug shot effect, the portraitee is to tilt his head. But the gesture is broken down here into its components-two different hands, a pull in opposite directions, and a conflict of intentions between an uncomfortable subject and a photographer trying to Fig. 3 get a good picture. We might say this amounts to a deconstruction of traditional portraiture: it shows not the worth and social standing of a subject who seeks to immortalize himself, but bodily suffering, the sweat, pain, eyes shut, the transience of human life and its violability. The putative violence of the beating becomes the de facto violence of photography. The picture not only shows "bare life"; it also shows that without photographic violence we would never actually "see" bare life.
Switching from the language of photography to that of political theory, we might say that the place of the all-powerful sovereign in these pictures is occupied by the camera itself. This is certainly the case in fig. 3, but consider fig. 1 , too. There is the evident hostility by some of the men toward the photographer. But that is not all. With the sole exception of the little girl, it is unclear whether the mourners look at the photographer crouched beside the grave, or at the grave itself. In the end it seems that the camera (and by extension I who scrutinize this picture) occupy the space of death. And there are several other pictures that work through this idea: the portrait of a blind man, for instance, staring unseeingly into the camera, with the shadow of the photographer distinctly outlined on his canvass shirt, a picture with Foucaultian overtones that hardly need to be spelled out; or the picture of a man carrying a large joint of raw meat on his head, taken against the backdrop of a white adobe wall, with the shadow of the photographer crouching, very distinct on the white wall, like a predatory beast, and the subject patently unaware of the fact that his picture is being taken.
The troubling, disturbing ambiguity of Gilden's photographs is thus a complicated matter. No doubt, there is a certain complicity with a discourse about Haiti as the grotesque Other of Western civilization. What are we to make of fig. 2 , for instance? The Magnum web gallery gives us the following caption "Port-au-Prince. 1984. Flour worker in La Saline eating lunch." A fairly mundane scene, it turns out. But without that information we are more likely to think of zombies. The radical decontextualization and the erasure of any political space or historical reference produce a Haiti that is opaque and incomprehensible: suffering bodies, violent death, zombie-like figures, a world that does not draw a categorical distinction between the life of animals and of humans, or even between life and death.
But the issue is further complicated by the fact that there is a reflexive insight: it is the camera that produces these pictures-what Gilden's camera "sees" is usually not visible to the bare eye. It is not necessarily Haiti. It all turns on angles, on shadows, on focus, on composition. The photographer is part of the picture: as shadow, as hand, as focus of the subject's gaze. Haitian "bare life" is a product of the photographic artifice.
This artistic self-awareness is of course a fairly conventional strategy and does not necessarily solve the moral and political questions: what does it mean to say "it is not really Haiti" if the book is titled Haiti? Still, it matters that this reflexivity is presented as a power relation: the subjects' gaze is confrontational, the hand manipulates, the photographer intrudes. Photography as interpellation? As performance? We could argue that Gilden's pictures stage the operations of power on "bare life"; that they are reenactments of life in the Global South, and that the decontextualized, depoliticized bodies must not be misunderstood as pertaining to the discourse of exotic Otherness. The subjects are imposed upon, cajoled, intercepted: that is the point. When we speak the language of "bare life," we always speak the language of the sovereign.
But, in the end, I wonder whether we can really understand Gilden's photographs in terms of a purely cognitivist aesthetics. Is it our desire for knowledge that they satisfy? Do we enjoy them because they make us understand the operations of power in Haiti? That seems unlikely.
I think that its aesthetics of "bare life" engage us on an affective level that remains deeply ambiguous. The unsettling subject matter of the photographs and their striking artistic quality work against each other, with one operating as a limit on the other. Their stark beauty and artistic power work as a bulwark against a contextual involvement, be it of the cognitive or the humanistic sort. It is not possible to say we feel pity for the corpse on the street. The picture does not invite us to ask why he is dead and what killed him. We worry about the flies-what Barthes in his classic essay on photography called the "punctum."26
At the same time, however, their disturbing subject matter works against any feeling of aesthetic pleasure. Again, the comparison with Salgado might be useful here: even where the subject is poverty, or a refugee camp, or life in a favela, Salgado offers us "the people" for our aesthetic pleasure. But how could we possibly say the picture of the corpse gives us an occasion for pleasure? If pushed, we might say, at most, that these pictures are technically sophisticated and the result of a lot of patience and hard work.
Where does that leave us? It is a place of both intense discomfort and enjoyment, a place where it becomes difficult to know whether our discomfort is the result of having seen too much already or of not having seen it all, or perhaps of having enjoyed something that is really beyond enjoyment. "Bare life" becomes a site of what we might call, with Lacan, "surplus enjoyment" or jouissance, where pleasure and pain become indistinguishable and where ultimately a desire for "more" would turn into an unbearable closeness: sadistic violence.
Roland Barthes, 26.
Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) .
